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ABSTRACT
 As of late November 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic killed more than 250,000 
people in America despite having early warning of the virus’ lethality and some of the 
world’s best public health institutions. In today’s media landscape, conservative 
commentators have an enormous influence on President Donald Trump as well as 
American political discourse broadly. This study focused how the top conservative 
commentators on YouTube influenced their audience by their coverage of the Covid-19 
pandemic. By examining over 1,600 YouTube comments from videos from February to 
July 2020, this paper investigates who conservative media consumers principally blamed, 
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At the outset, many expected the United States of America to be able to contain 
the novel coronavirus like it had handled previous pandemics. Other comparable 
countries like New Zealand, Iceland, Australia, Brunei, China, Taiwan and Thailand were 
able to successfully manage its spread largely through strict lockdowns, mask ordinances, 
clear risk communication strategies, and a national unity to accept momentary 
inconveniences for the common good (Bremmer, Jun. 12, 2020). As of September 2020, 
the U.S. is still the global leader of both coronavirus cases and deaths and in late July, 
White House coronavirus advisor Dr. Anthony Fauci testified that it is unlikely Covid-19 
will ever be eradicated (Lovelace, Jul. 22, 2020). How did it get this bad? As the 
American Federal Government failed to muster a sufficient national response to contain 
the coronavirus, and would later shift responsibility away from the federal level, local 
governments took steps to implement new laws to contain the spread of the coronavirus. 
What some might not have expected would be the significant resistance from their own 
citizens from measures that would keep them safe in the long run. On June 23rd, 
Florida’s Palm Beach County council heard testimony from agitated activists who 
believed that their own government was conspiring against them.  
“You literally cannot mandate somebody to wear a mask, knowing that 
that mask is killing people. It literally is killing people. We, the people, are 
waking up… and every single one of you [lawmakers] who are obeying 
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the Devil’s laws [by mandating mask ordinances in public spaces] are 
going to be arrested. You, doctor, are going to be arrested for crimes 
against humanity… Every single one of you are going to be punished by 
God. You cannot escape God not even with the mask [ordinance] or the 
six feet [social distancing recommendation] ... All of you are practicing 
the Devil’s laws. What happened to Bill Gates? Why isn’t he in jail? Why 
is Hillary Clinton not in jail? Why are all these pedophiles that are 
demanding you to listen to their rules, why are they not in jail? Is it 
because you’re a part of them? Are you a part of the deep state?”  
While her testimony was subsequently mocked online, her misunderstanding of 
the public health crisis was emblematic of something more: The American public is not 
only reckoning with a media landscape rife with misinformation (Orlowski, 2020), but 
are so politically motivated that many reject information that is counter to their 
preconceived worldview (Uscinski et al., 2020; Kahan, 2017).  
According to a March GallupPoll, people's opinions about whether it is easier or 
harder to be informed are strongly related to their attitudes about the media. Seventy 
percent of those who have a positive opinion of the media say it is easier to be informed, 
while 64 percent of those with a negative opinion of the news media say it is harder 
(Ritter, Apr. 9, 2020). These numbers would fall even harder along partisan lines a month 
later. In April, 85 percent of Democrats said the Trump administration was a main source 
of misinformation about the virus, but only 4 percent of Republicans agreed. For 75 
percent of Republicans, mainstream national news was the main source of virus 
misinformation, but only 2 percent of Democrats agreed.  
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We have yet to know the final global impact of the novel coronavirus pandemic 
but the delays, denials, and misinformation about COVID-19 have exacerbated its spread 
and slowed pandemic response across the world, particularly in the U.S. (e.g., Abutaleb 
et al., 2020). Americans are divided about many political issues, but how did the severity 
of the coronavirus become a partisan fight? An August YouGov poll found that nearly 
three-fourths of Republicans approved of how the U.S. was responding to coronavirus, 
while 75 percent of self-identifying liberals said the U.S. response was very bad. Ten 
percent of registered Democrats and 33 percent of registered independents believe that 
the 185,000 coronavirus deaths were acceptable. Among registered Republicans, 57 
percent believed those deaths were an acceptable amount (Salavanto et al., Aug 23, 
2020).  
While the role that misinformation played in slowing the American’s federal 
government’s response to COVID-19 is better understood, less is known about what role 
the media played in spreading that misinformation.  
Americans’ attention to the news has increased from early December 2019 to 
March 2020 (Ritter, Apr. 9, 2020) but where they would go to get accurate information 
about the coronavirus depended on a number of factors. According to the April 
Gallup/Knight Foundation poll, younger people (18-34) were more likely to consult 
health professionals or official health organization websites directly while older people 
(55+) were more likely to get information from the one or two news sources they trust 
most (Jones, May 11, 2020).   
Polling from the early stages of the pandemic suggests that many Americans were 
misinformed about COVID-19 from the beginning. In early March 2020, a poll 
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conducted by YouGov and The Economist found that 13 percent of Americans believed 
the coronavirus was a hoax, 49 percent believed the coronavirus was man made, and 44 
percent believed the threat of coronavirus was being exaggerated for political reasons 
(Economist, 2020). A mid April Gallup/Knight Foundation poll found that 58 percent of 
US adults say they are well-informed about the virus while 36 percent say they’re 
overwhelmed by all of the information going around (Jones, May 11, 2020).  
This divide seems to be consequential - as the decisions that Americans made to 
learn about the virus informed their beliefs about the virus and their behavior. A March 
1st Civiqs poll found 68 percent of Democrats were moderately or extremely concerned 
about COVID-19, but only 21 percent of Republicans expressed moderate or extreme 
concern (Badger and Quealy, 2020). Another Quinnipiac University poll released early in 
March found that roughly 6 in 10 Republican voters were not especially concerned that 
the coronavirus would disrupt their lives (Quinnipiac University/Poll, 2020; Russonello, 
2020a). Further, there have been considerable partisan gaps with respect to how citizens 
were responding to the crisis, such as washing their hands, working from home, or 
changing their travel plans (Stecula, 2020).  
The variation in media coverage of the pandemic in its early stages may help 
explain these partisan differences. Some American media, particularly popular right-
leaning outlets and pundits, spouted hoaxes and conspiracy theories behind the pandemic: 
Sean Hannity said the virus was a fraud by the “deep state” trying to spread panic, 
manipulate the economy, and suppress dissent; Rush Limbaugh suggested the virus was a 
plot hatched by the Chinese to harm the U.S. economy; and Fox Business anchor Trish 
Regan told viewers that the worry over coronavirus “is yet another attempt to impeach 
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the president” (Peters and Grynbaum, 2020). As denial and disinformation exploded on 
right-leaning media outlets, many conservative elites correspondingly downplayed 
concern about the virus (Abutaleb et al., 2020; Badger and Quealy, 2020; Peters and 
Grynbaum, 2020; Russonello, 2020b; Warzel, 2020).  
Previous academic research has demonstrated that people accept factually 
incorrect information as true if it originates from trusted sources or affirms their political 
and social worldviews (Kahan, 2017). Considerable evidence also suggests that political 
identity leads people to engage in motivated conspiracy endorsements that damage their 
political rivals (Flynn et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2016). These motivations may be 
amplified in an environment where the pandemic is highly politicized and trusted opinion 
leaders also endorse dubious COVID claims (Stecula, 2020). As a result, even seemingly 
innocuous denials or false claims from relied-upon media sources may lead individuals 
either into a false sense of security or lead others to ignore government recommendations. 
The spread of misinformation about COVID-19 could be particularly problematic 
if misinformed people are subsequently less likely to trust advice from experts or medical 
professionals. Previous research has found that misinformation about vaccine safety is 
associated with increased skepticism about the role medical professionals play in the 
policy-making process (Motta et al. 2018) and also with noncompliance with expert-
backed health behaviors (such as wearing sunscreen or vaccinating children) (Oliver and 
Wood, 2014). The highly partisan nature of early media coverage of the coronavirus 
pandemic had important public health consequences. The relative prominence of COVID 
misinformation shared by right-leaning media may have contributed to the spread of 
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misinformation about COVID and subsequently undermined support for information 
from public health experts. 
Across multiple media channels, conservative media (Fox News, Breitbart, Daily 
Wire, Lowder with Crowder, and PragerU) regularly discussed misinformation about 
COVID-19 during the early stages of the pandemic. Further, nationally representative 
survey data suggest that people who consumed right-leaning media during that time were 
more likely to endorse COVID-19 misinformation (Uscinski et al., 2020). Misinformed 
people were more likely to believe that the CDC exaggerated COVID’s health risks, 
suggesting that media coverage of the virus in the early stages of the pandemic may have 
had important public health consequences. While previous studies (Brigman et al., 2020; 
Uscinski et al., 2020) have examined the relationship between conservative media 
coverage and misinformation, this article will take a closer look at how conservative 
media audiences responded to conservative media coverage of the coronavirus.   
The author decided to focus the attention on media effects from YouTube because 
it is tremendously influential as a popular social media platform, but its moderation of 
politically motivated conspiracy theories has been lax in recent years (Lewis, 2018). In 
fact, according to the Pew Research Center, more than a quarter of Americans get their 
news from YouTube (Stocking et al., Sept. 28, 2020). However, researchers have pointed 
out problems with YouTube’s algorithm (Lewis, 2018; Orolowski, 2020), that promote 
controversial and shocking content because it is engaging rather than factual and 
explanatory content that can be trusted. Because of YouTube’s low standards of content 
moderation, misinformation garners a wide audience and spreads quickly - embroiling the 
video hosting platform in a number of scandals. For example, the platform was 
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responsible for promoting conspiracy videos about the mass shooting in Las Vegas 
(Levin, Oct. 4, 2017), facilitated disinformation on such a scale that may have swayed the 
2019 election in Brazil (Fisher and Taub, Aug. 11, 2019), and being the platform used 
most by fascist groups in the US to indoctrinate others into their far-right world view 
(Evans, 2018). While previous studies (Brigman et al., 2020; Uscinski et al., 2020) have 
examined the relationship between conservative media coverage and coronavirus 
misinformation on television and on Twitter, this article will focus specifically of 
conservative news coverage on YouTube.   
In this article, the author will be examining how the conservative coverage of the 
coronavirus on YouTube affected its audience by examining user comments across three 
channels: a total of more than 1,500 user comments (the top 30 comments from over 50 
videos). This study will be examining the subject of these comments: how much of the 
audiences’ ire was focused on external threats, how their internal processes were 
influenced by social biases, and how the comment section became a virtual space to 
engage with a like-minded community.  
This article exists at the nexus of several disparate fields of study in mass 
communication. Particularly, it relies on previous studies of conservative media 
(DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Hopkins and Ladd, 2014) and explores the history of 
conservative media as it adapts to new technologies. As it relates to social media and 
participatory culture, this article relies on recent studies on the kinds of influence that 
YouTube has on its audience (Orlowski, 2020; Lewis, 2018 & 2019). Finally, this article 
seeks to expand on coronavirus misinformation studies (Brigman et al., 2020; Uscinski et 
al., 2020) that seeks to understand why lawmakers and their citizens would not adopt 
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simple public health measures to slow the spread of coronavirus. Media practitioners 
should use this study to reflect on the impact that political influencers, particularly on 
YouTube, can have on spreading misinformation about the politicized pandemics. This 
article will expand on the existing study of social media’s facilitation of the spread of 
misinformation and examine the kinds of relationships consumers have with conservative 







CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 HOW SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS IS POLITICALLY UNDERMINED IN 
THE MEDIA  
In the wake of the World Health Organization declaring that the coronavirus 
pandemic would be a world catastrophe, they launched a platform designed to combat the 
spread of misinformation (Zarocostas, 2020). This platform, EPI-WIN, was supposed to 
combat the spread of misinformation around the virus and prevent the ensuing ‘info-
demic,’ a portmanteau of the word ‘information’ and ‘pandemic’ used to describe the 
wealth of misinformation and conspiracy theories that would be widely available on the 
internet. While many world leaders would describe the virus as a common enemy that 
divided factions must unite to combat (Oprysko and Luthi, Mar. 18 2020), that did not 
insulate the response effort from being highly politicized to suit certain American 
political goals. In fact, the scientific consensus around taking governmental action and 
acting in the favor of public health, has a long history of being undermined politically in 
American media (Oreskes and Conway, 2010).  
This history of undue skepticism about scientific consensus has an impact on the 
public trust in scientific experts and public health officials (Motta et al. 2018; Oliver and 
Wood, 2014). Despite the severity of the coronavirus and the need for immediate, 
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decisive action to contain its spread, the necessary public health measures were not 
immediately followed because of certain political interests and entrenched media 
dynamics suited to cater to those interests.  
Skepticism around scientific consensus has been a main feature of American 
conservative ideology since 1965. This kind of undue skepticism about scientific 
consensus has been a major factor in a number of public health problems: smoking, 
asbestos, the hole in the ozone layer, fracking, second hand smoke, GMOs, acid rain, 
CFC’s, climate change, and now around the government response to coronavirus.  
In their 2010 book Merchants of Doubt, authors Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway 
documented the use of sowing doubt around scientific consensus as a political tactic they 
call the Tobacco Strategy. Historically, this process of preventing scientific consensus 
from becoming regulatory policy begins not with finding facts, but fighting them 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010).  
A crucial first step in this process involves finding highly visible scientists who 
can produce a public study that does not accord with the scientific consensus. For 
example, in February 1988, Philip Morris International hired scientists deliberately 
outside of the smoking industry to “be able to produce research or stimulate controversy" 
around the scientific consensus and create the illusion of a continued scientific debate, 
when in actuality there was none (Schwartz, May 9, 1997). This parallel can be seen 23 
years later when Fox News host Sean Hannity read a letter on March 23 from an 
unidentified doctor “in the New York area” about the effectiveness of treating 
coronavirus with hydroxychloroquine (Media Matters, Mar. 23 2020). It can also be seen 
over a month later when Dr. Daniel Erickson and Dr. Artin Massihi went viral for 
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publishing a study comparing the virus’ severity to the flu, garnering over 4 million 
views, and a lengthy interview with Fox News’ Laura Ingram on April, 28, 2020 (Times 
of San Diego, Apr. 28, 2020). In both cases, those scientists’ credentials were leveraged 
by public affairs people, including those on social media and in the news.  
The Tobacco Strategy relies on scientists, public relations experts, partisan media, 
and lawyers to “maintain the controversy” and “keep the debate alive” in the court of 
public opinion in order to avoid governmental action (Losovitz, Feb. 25, 2017). A second 
important step in the Tobacco Strategy is the desire for a continuous public debate 
between the two sets of scientists (Oreskes and Conway, 2010). In fact, the presence of 
the two sets of scientists are designed to conflate the posturing that happens in political 
discourse with robust scientific debate. In the context of a debate, the scientists’ 
credentials are used as a way of concealing possible political motivations and thus the 
disagreement is interpreted as a scientific debate rather than a political one. Because of 
this, the scientific consensus of one side can appear to be in dispute if the opposing 
argument comes from another scientist. As long as the opposing side can engage in a 
vociferous debate in the public eye, the ‘consensus’ is perceived to be still up for 
consideration and not yet worthy of immediate action.  
In the context of coronavirus, as conservative media and right wing politicians in 
America resisted immediate and strict public health measures, largely by following the 
Tobacco Strategy. It is important to note that these lawmakers and media figures 
delineated slightly from the Tobacco Strategy as they did the majority of the debating on 
behalf of the doctors, rather than having the doctors do it themselves. Media Matters for 
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America, an organization that monitors right-wing disinformation across multiple 
channels, published almost over 850 stories about coronavirus misinformation from  
conservative media as of September. In a brief overview of their published stories, few of 
the stories’ headlines contain scientists or medical professionals - with a majority of the 
misinformation coming from reactionary figures of rightwing media channels.  
Regardless, the Tobacco Strategy appears to mirror the coronavirus response. 
Despite having politically motivated and often unscientific research, the opposing side 
can appear to be equal to the best scientific opinion as a public disagreement gives the 
impression of a serious debate, whose merits are worthy of discussion. Because 
scientists’ credentials are so heavily used in this public discussion, artificially inflated 
doubt can be conflated with healthy scientific skepticism. It creates the impression that 
everything is unresolved and thus nothing can be done yet: “Doubt is our product” ran the 
infamous memo written by one tobacco industry executive in 1969, “since it is the best 
means of competing with the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the minds of the general public” 
(Oreskes and Conway, 2010 pg. 34; Smoking and Health Proposal, 1969).  
Regardless of their credibility or credentials, when each ‘side’ is given equal time, 
their arguments are perceived to be of equal importance, and thus the matter is ongoing 
and undetermined. The presence of this debate can be further complicated when there are 
multiple, possibly politically motivated sources who can repeat the unscientific claim and 
appear to give it corroboration. In our modern media ecosystem, of media bubbles and 
echo chambers, news media networks and prominent social media profiles can reach 
thousands of people and can even unintentionally give oxygen to misinformation and 
conspiracy theories by making the two narratives appear to be equally worthy of 
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consideration (Orlowski, 2020). Even though public health measures have the backing of 
scientific rigor and scholarship, and the other doesn’t, something patently false like  
anti-vaccination conspiracies can appear to be true if it has enough public salience (Jang 
et al., 2017; Maza, May 9, 2019).  
Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) developed a measure to 
understand how humans perceive truth and developed the Coherence Test to determine 
whether a fact-claim can be accepted as true (Christian, 1998). According to the 
Coherence Test, a claim can only be accepted as true if it coheres with facts that have 
already been accepted as true. For example, consider the following fact claim: There are 
no sharks in Lake Murray. Under the Coherence Test, one can compare this claim to 
other accepted facts like 1) Lake Murray is freshwater, 2) most sharks live in saltwater, 3) 
the Saluda Dam closes the lake off to the ocean, 4) Freshwater sharks cannot swim past 
the dam, and 5) no one has ever reported being bitten by a shark at Lake Murray.  
However the Coherence Test has a serious flaw as it relies on a previous set of 
assumptions that are believed to be true, whose veracity also largely depends on public 
salience. In fact, Ciuk and Yost (2016) found that people’s willingness to adopt policy-
relevant information instead of partisan cues depends on the salience of a particular issue. 
While this body of research is expanding, Yeyati et al. (2020) found that partisan elites 
can have degrees of influence on public opinion. According to their research, the 
endorsement of ideas from party elites can polarize public opinions when no prior 
polarization exists. Using partisan and leader cues prove of little use in bridging opinion 
gaps and building policy support in political climates that are not already polarized.  
2.2 HOW CONSERVATIVE MEDIA BEGAN AND HOW IT OPERATES  
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The emergence of partisan news - as well as political media that presents itself as 
news - broadly emerged after the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987. The policy, 
aimed at mandating newscasters to give equal time to two sides of a controversial issue, 
was broadly aimed at making sure that Americans were uniformly informed about ‘both 
sides’ of an issue to prevent individual media groups from having an outsized influence 
on American political discourse. At the time, explicitly conservative media was relegated 
to William F. Buckley’s The National Review and the monthly American Spectator 
(Anderson, Sep. 2017). When the Fairness Doctrine was repealed in 1987, Rush 
Limbaugh launched his national right-wing radio show a year later and inspired others 
across the country. In the 90’s Rupert Murdoch conceived of a conservative alternative to 
CNN and, with the help of Nixon aide Roger Ailes, launched the Fox News Channel 
which joined the airwaves in 1996 (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005).  
In June 2011, the Nixon presidential library resurfaced a 318 page memo from 
Ailes outlining his plans in 1970 to be “Putting the GOP on TV News” (Cook, Jun. 30, 
2011). Ailes’ plan was “to provide pro-administraiton, videotape hard news actualities to 
the major cities of the United States” in order to circumvent the gatekeeping of 
conventional news media. Ultimately, Ailes’ strategy was to undermine conventional 
journalistic reporting and set a new media agenda, one that was always favorable to 
Nixon and the Republican party. In the memo, he envisioned having a media organization 
designed to disseminate interviews with pro-Nixon Republicans directly to their 
constituency so that they could directly influence public opinion without “the censorship, 
the priorities, and prejudices of network news selectors and disseminators.”  
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With a fawning media organization, Republicans and the Nixon White House 
would be able to control the agenda setting power of the news media to its advantage. 
This plan to create a pro-Republican media organization specifically relied on television 
because “television news is watched more often than people read newspapers, than 
people listen to the radio, than people read or gather any other form of communication. 
The reason: People are lazy. With television you just sit—watch—listen. The thinking is 
done for you.” Thus when Ailes later launched Fox News, it differentiated itself from 
other major television news networks as being “balanced” and “fair,” and painted 
conventional news networks as deceitful and illegitimate.  
Because technology at the time was slowly advancing and the vast 
communications infrastructure that exists today was still being built, the Fox News 
Channel was not broadcasted across the country at the same time. Initially, the company 
had to negotiate with individual cable companies and would take until the mid 2000s to 
be accessible to the entire country. Due to the incremental layout, researchers were able 
to determine that the individual media markets that aired the Fox News Channel 
increased turnout among Republican voters and induced independents to vote for George 
W. Bush in 2000 (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Hopkins and Ladd, 2014). Additionally, 
Clinton and Emamordo (2014) found evidence that the congressional representatives of 
the areas where Fox News aired marginally reduced their support for President Bill 
Clinton.  
A significant aspect of how partisan media works is what Kahan (2017) refers to 
as identity-protective cognition, which describes a tendency of culturally diverse 
individuals to selectively credit and dismiss evidence in patterns that reflect their 
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preconceived worldview. He found that people can accept factually incorrect information 
as true if it originates from trusted sources or affirms their political and social 
worldviews. Broadly, the existence of partisan media allows audiences to choose the 
narrative about an event that they agree with, rather than subjecting themselves to 
mainstream coverage that could contain narratives that disagree with their preconceived 
notions and expose the audiences to the possible identity-threatening feelings that may 
arise from reconciling the two (Kahan, 2020).  
Considerable evidence also suggests that political identity leads people to engage 
in motivated conspiracy endorsement impugning their political rivals (Flynn et al., 2017; 
Miller et al., 2016). These motivations may be amplified in an environment where the 
pandemic is highly politicized and trusted opinion leaders also endorse dubious COVID 
claims (Stecula, 2020). As a result, even seemingly innocuous denials or false claims 
from relied-upon media sources may lead individuals either into a false sense of security 
or lead others to ignore public health recommendations.  
The success of conservative media cannot be overstated. Fox News is the most 
watched cable news network in the country and has been for a while. In both June 2020 
and July 2020, Fox News was the highest-rated television channel in the prime-time 
hours of 8 to 11 p.m. The average live Fox News viewership in those hours outstripped 
cable rivals like CNN, MSNBC and ESPN, as well as the broadcast networks ABC, CBS 
and NBC, according to Nielsen (Grynbaum, Aug. 9, 2020). In short, there was nothing 
more popular on television than Tucker Carlson Tonight, Hannity, and The Laura 
Ingraham Show - for better or worse, Fox News Programming is primetime television 
(Grynbaum, Aug. 9, 2020).  
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As a whole, the channel generates an estimated $2.7 billion for its parent 
company 21st Century Fox (Mayer, Mar. 11, 2019), and its influence on American 
politics is unparalleled. President Donald Trump is not only a frequent guest for 
interviews, he also regularly consults with its programmers, and employs many former 
Fox News staffers in his administration (Mayer, Mar. 11, 2019). The President spends 
much of his time in office watching television (Haberman et al., Dec. 9, 2017; Gertz, Jan. 
05, 2018). His tweets regularly follow the Fox News programming that he consumes so 
closely that experts claim he “prefers to rely on conservative cable news hosts to 
understand current events” rather than the federally funded information gathering 
apparatus designed to help the American executive branch (Gertz, Jan. 5, 2018).  
In fact, Fox News has catered to the political right for so long, that they now 
basically operate as a media arm for the Republican party, according to its own 
employees. In the wake of numerous layoffs in Fox News’ fact-checking team, an 
anonymous current Fox News employee told the Daily Beast “It looks like Fox is more 
like an extension of [the Trump] administration, insead of a news network” (Falzone and 
Grove, Sept. 28, 2020). Even under oath, lawyers for Tucker Carlson Tonight, one of the 
most watched shows on television at the moment, referred to its own news program as 
“hyperbolic opinion commentary,” and explicitly not “sober factual reporting.” Fox News 
attorney Erin Murphy even questioned that “would a reasonable viewer be coming here 
[to Tucker Carlson Tonight] and thinking, ‘this is where I’m going to be hearing the news 
of the day?’ raising doubt that one of the most watched shows on the Fox News Network 
has audiences that do not believe that Tucker Carlson would tell the truth about the news 
(Pierce, Jun 21, 2020).  
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In addition to the words from Fox News’ own employees, the actions of both 
media figures and Republican politicians raise questions about the right-wing news 
media. Numerous Fox News hosts have broken traditional norms of journalistic 
objectivity as they often campaign with the president and for the Republican party 
(Mayer, Mar. 11, 2019; Maza, Nov. 26 2018). Numerous politicians have gone on Fox 
News multiple times and received political benefit from campaign donations or 
governmental contracts because of it (Derysh, May 20, 2020; Merchant, Aug. 3, 2020; 
Caputo, Aug. 29, 2018).  
As an example of conservative media’s influence, Fox News is the most watched 
cable news program and its impact on electoral politics in America is unlike any other. 
Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) found that if the channel had never existed, the Republican 
presidential candidate’s share of the two-party vote would have been 3.59 points lower in 
2004 and 6.34 points lower in 2008. That means that John Kerry would have been the 
2004 popular vote winner, and in an alternative 2008, Barack Obama’s victory would 
have turned into a 60% landslide victory. Arceneaux et al. (2016) found that Fox News 
was so powerful at influencing congressional lawmakers, even Democrats increased 
support for Republican party positions on divisive votes in the months before an 
election.  
Fox News and conservative media also affects individuals in subtler ways. Ash 
and Poyker (2019) found that “exposure to conservative news causes judges to impose 
harsher criminal sentences... Fox News viewership increases incarceration length, and the 
effect is stronger for black defendants and for drug-related crimes.” Vargo et al., (2017) 
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also found that partisan media is incredibly susceptible to consume and disseminate 
misinformation and fake news.  
The success of conservative media coincided with the emerging technological 
platforms as well. The huge success of Limbaugh inspired a wide variety of conservative 
radio shows and without any substantial media regulation, created a vast network of 
conservative media airing misrepresentations, misinformation, and sometimes outright 
conspiracy theories (Williamson and Steel, Sept. 7, 2018). More media channels, 
including on television, the radio, and eventually on the internet, led to media a 
‘narrowcast’ (Hamilton, 2005), resulting in media channels catering to different segments 
of the population. Partisan news networks emerged from this fragmented media 
environment (Webster, 2005), giving rise to individualized ‘media bubbles’ as opposed to 
the uniform broadcasting of the past (Stroud, 2011).  
This narrowcast becomes even more challenging in the era of social media. 
According to a 2020 study conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 1 in 5 
Americans get their news primarily from social media, less likely to closely follow major 
news stories, and less informed about the events themselves (Pew Research, Jul. 30 
2020). The ability to curate one’s source of information based on their appetite for news, 
political affiliation, or interest in newsworthy topics directly impacts their real-world 
response to their political reality (Orolowski, 2020). Bridgman et al. (2020) found that 
exposure to social media is associated with misperceptions about basic facts about 
COVID-19 while the inverse is true for news media.  
Orolowski’s (2020) The Social Dilemma outlines the effect that social media has 
on Americans’ perception of their political reality. Because social media giants like 
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Facebook are so adept at collecting their users’ data, they determine which users are more 
likely to endorse conspiracy theories and feed them conspiratorial content. In fact, they  
can find users who are susceptible to being radicalized by sensational political content 
and market that content directly to those users. Content producers can essentially target 
their audience with content they are sure to enjoy. Producers of political content on social 
media especially have perverse incentives as they will make more money based on how 
much attention they garner. There are financial incentives for these political social media 
influencers to make bold statements and calamitous predictions. Lewis (2018) found that 
these dynamics happen especially on conservative YouTube channels, whose coverage 
pushes their audience to political extremes on YouTube’s platform.  
2.3 CONSERVATIVE MEDIA IN THE ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA  
YouTube is among the most popular video-streaming platforms in the world and, 
because of its popularity, it has elevated certain content creators to celebrity and financial 
success. These content creators are able to amass huge platforms as its most popular 
creators can rival the celebrity of superstar athletes and traditional media figures 
(MorningConsult, 2019). Numerous media scholars have looked into how influential 
YouTubers are on their viewers (O’Calagahan el al., 2015; Lee and Watkins, 2016; 
Ferchaud et al., 2017; Lewis, 2018).  
An important element of the research on YouTube has focused on the illusory 
social interactions (Horton and Wohl, 1956) that exists between the YouTube creator and 
their audience. These interactions, called parasocial relationships (PSR), can mimic the 
two-way relationships people have offline: through features on the platform, viewers can 
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communicate to creators and other viewers through comments or upload videos 
responding to other videos. Jung, Youn, and McClung (2007) found that these  
communicative features allow users to become active gratification seekers in similar 
ways as they would on other social networking platforms .  
All of this is to suggest that a key factor in studying PSR is the perception of 
authenticity. Rubin and Rubin (1985) found that the perceived realism of a soap opera 
positively related to the audience’s parasocial interaction of its characters. Levy (1979) 
found that one of the most common parasocial indicators of newscasters is that they “are 
almost like friends you see every day” (p.180). These PSRs are powerful as viewers find 
YouTube content creators to be credible and trustworthy (Rasmussen, 2018; Johnson, 
2017; Ault, 2014). Several quantitative analyses have found similar results (Chapple and 
Cownie, 2017; Morris and Anderson, 2015), with some investigating the perceived 
intimacy between YouTube creators and their audiences (Berryman and Kavka, 2017).  
This perceived authenticity is a key aspect of the popularity of YouTube 
influencers, conservative political influencers use that both as a marketing tool and 
rhetorical technique (Lewis, 2019). In this way, by using subtle techniques and 
emphasizing “relatability, authenticity, and accountability” viewers feel like they can 
have a closer, less polished connection to the conservative YouTuber that doesn’t exist on 
television. Lewis (2018) outlines how YouTubers and their audience have a feedback 
loop relationship where they are both shaped by the coverage and the source of its 
demand - elevating influencers not based on their adherence to journalistic norms but on 
who can best cater to their expectations.  
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When YouTube was created in 2005, it was conceived as a video library that 
contained trivial videos that wouldn’t have significant effects on American political 
discourse, but as the platform grew and its users became more savvy, it became 
tremendously influential on political discourse. In the past three years alone, the now 
Google owned company has faced a number of high profile public relations scandals: 
including promoting conspiracy videos about the mass shooting in Las Vegas (Levin, 
Oct. 4, 2017), facilitating disinformation on such a scale that may have swayed the 2019 
election in Brazil (Fisher and Taub, Aug. 11, 2019), and being the platform used most by 
fascist groups in the US to indoctrinate others into their far-right world view (Evans, 
2018; Lewis, 2018).  
In 2011, former conservative radio host Dennis Prager wanted to harness new 
technologies and create a conservative media channel on YouTube. This new channel 
would be made in opposition to a “Liberal Media” conspiracy (which we’ll examine 
later) that he sees as dominated by liberal political activists who have infiltrated every 
level of knowledge production, namely in the news media and universities. The channel’s 
concept is giving the viewer a short, digestible conservative perspective about 
conventional political topics that are designed to be in place of a semester long college 
course on the subject:  
“Our kids aren’t learning that America is a land of opportunity, a defender 
of freedom around the world, a source of pride. They’re learning that 
America is land of inequality and racism and imperialist power, 
something to be ashamed of. Is there a way to undo this damage? There 
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is: it’s called PragerU, a totally new concept in education ” (“The Mission 
of PragerU,” Aug. 24, 2015).  
The channel has grown since 2011 and is now a 501(c)(3) that accepts online 
donations through its website. Although portraying itself as a university, as well as Prager 
admitting to Mother Jones that it was created as a virtual university (Oppenheimer, Mar. 
2018), the channel’s website says it is not an accredited university and does not claim to 
be [anymore]. In fact, PragerU is largely funded by fracking billionaires Dan and Farris 
Wilks, who were supportive of Prager’s attempt to mass-produce conservative narratives  
in the trappings of an academic work (Shea, Apr. 30, 2015; Oppenheimer, Mar. 2018; 
Johnston, May 7, 2018).  
In a similar way, former Canadian voice actor and Fox News guest Steven 
Crowder wanted to make a conservative alternative to political comedy shows. In 2009, 
he began uploading comedy bits on YouTube and attracted the attention of PJ Media who 
molded his burgeoning comedy career with his future as a political commentator. After 
YouTube, he was hired by Fox News and then transitioned into his own show on 
YouTube hosted by Glen Beck’s BlazeTV (Dickinson, Jul. 11, 2017). Crowder has more 
of a diversified revenue stream as he has one of the top political YouTube channels 
(second to the liberal The Young Turks’ 4.9 million subscribers), and regularly gets more 
than 100,000 views per video. In addition to his affiliation with BlazeTV and ad revenue 
from YouTube, he sells merchandise, and has an exclusive subscription service called his 
“MugClub.”  
Crowder's videos present themselves to be the conservative version of political 
comedy shows, but are filmed like sports radio shows as the host often bounces 
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conversation off of his co-hosts behind the audio controls. Crowder sometimes does 
segments that interact with the public. Some of his segments involve man on the street 
interviews, character sketches that involve the public, or debate requests with the public 
to “change his mind” about political subjects. His channel is influential as he has more 
than 4.5 million subscribers on YouTube, nearly twice as big as PragerU’s 2.7 million 
subscribers or The Daily Wire’s 2.2 million.  
The Daily Wire, like the other conservative flavors of pop culture, is a news and 
opinion site that does not do any original reporting and its articles are often less than 500 
words (Legum and Zekeria, Jun. 25 2020). It was founded in 2015 by Jeremy Boreing 
and Ben Shapiro, former editor of Brietbart.com. Shapiro, who initially wanted a writing 
job in Hollywood, transitioned into conservative commentary after graduating from 
Harvard Law School. Shapiro, like Crowder, prides himself on his skills in debate but 
sticks more towards a straightforward conservative media format.  
Despite having a small news site that does not do original reporting, The Daily 
Wire is incredibly popular on social media, vastly overperforming traditional news media 
like The New York Times, CNN, The Washington Post, and HuffPost on Facebook 
(Legum and Zekeria, Jun 25. 2020). An investigation by the Popular Information 
newsletter found that a vast network of popular conservative pages on Facebook exist to 
promote Daily Wire content (Legum, Oct. 28, 2019). Leaks from Facebook employees to 
NBC News revealed that the site regularly shields conservative media sites like PragerU 
and The Daily Wire from persistent misinformation infractions (Solon, Aug. 7, 2020).  
Despite having cozy relationships with Facebook, The Daily Wire does not appear 
to have a financial relationship with the social media giant. The Daily Wire appears to 
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have a diverse revenue stream, taking an initial investment from the Wilks fracking 
billionaires, an exclusive subscription service, in addition to Shaprio accepting regular 
speaking fees with various Koch Foundation groups (Nguyen, Dec. 9, 2018; Johnston, 
Jun. 25 2019).  
The three channels operate in similar ways and exist in the same media ecosystem 
as they often host the creator of another channel onto their show (Lewis, 2018). The 
YouTube algorithm also pushes viewers of one channel to watch videos from another 
channel; thus while the three channels post different levels of views and engagement, it is 
conceivable that they share many of the same audience (Lewis, 2018). PragerU brands 
itself as being educational and being able to explain complex situations from a 
conservative perspective into short digestible videos. While the channel features longer 
discussion videos, they often cover a wide range of unrelated topics. Unlike PragerU’s 
shorter explanatory videos, Lowder with Crowder is centered around host Stephen 
Crowder who claims to be a conservative comedian and discusses various news items 
with his cohosts. He often does skits that involve mocking the public in some way and 
likes to engage with the public in debates. Finally, the Daily Wire can be seen as more of 
a traditional news network, or at least wraps itself in the trappings of a news broadcast. 
The show is usually hosted by one person who gives a conservative slant on the news and 
appears more to inform about subjects in the news rather than explain complex issues or 
make jokes. It is important to acknowledge that while these channels present themselves 
as authoritative, they do not produce original reporting.  
In fact, it is the effect that these channels have on their audience that motivates 
this inquiry. By examining audience comments, this article seeks to explore how the 
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coronavirus was understood by the audiences of the largest conservative YouTube 
channels. Particularly, this article seeks to explore the perspectives of the conservative 
YouTube audience about the coronavirus by asking three questions.  
Q1: Who were conservative YouTube audiences wanting to blame?  
By examining the external objects that commenters were concerned about, the 
author intends to gain a greater perspective on the entities or groups that they paid 
attention to during the pandemic. As previously mentioned, conservative groups were 
less likely to be concerned with the virus itself and this paper seeks to explore what they 
and the media they consumed paid attention to instead. In addition to focusing on the 
external objects, this article seeks to explore the socio-political ideologies that may 
inspire their worldview or their fascination with conservaitve YouTube. It is the author’s 
hope that by examining these socio-political processes, researchers can better understand 
why conservative media audiences were less likely to adopt simple public health 
measures to control the spread of the virus.  
Q2: What were the socio-political influences that commenters resonated with in 
conservative YouTube’s coverage of the coronavirus pandemic?  
Finally, this article seeks to do a more focused analysis on the YouTube medium 
itself. By investigating what the commenters reveal about themselves and how they speak 
to others, the author intends to explore the context of how the comment section connects 
its users.  







CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY 
This author selected the three most subscribed conservative media channels on 
YouTube. They include “The Daily Wire” which has 2.13 million subscribers, “PragerU” 
which has 2.7 million subscribers, and “Lowder with Crowder” which has 4.6 million 
subscribers. In addition to their popularity on the platform, the channels represent a range 
of overlapping conservative viewpoints that reject progressivism and wider social justice 
movements, brand themselves in opposition to the “Liberal Media,” and an adoration for 
Republican politicians and conservative thinkers. The three channels also appear in 
Lewis’ (2018) ‘Alternative Influence Network,’ defined by mutual appearances in the 
content of related conservative influencers. Finally, they fit similar conservative flavors 
of popular media, as the Daily Wire mimics a conservative newscast, Lowder with 
Crowder mimics a conservative political comedy show, and PragerU mimics a 
conservative educational video.  
Then the author went through all of their video archives on June 29th, 2020 and 
looked at the title of the videos that contained the word ‘virus,’ ‘coronavirus,’ or 
‘COVID-19.’ The author then only considered videos with 100,000 views or more 
bringing the total from 104 to 54. Each video was ordered chronologically so that it 
would be easier to understand the progression of their coverage. Then the author relied on 
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YouTube’s top comment feature, which relies on YouTube’s engagement metrics, copied 
and pasted the top 30 comments into a separate file, and were examined in that order.  
While each video was not watched in their entirety, all the 1,620 unique comments were 
examined critically.  
This article looked at the comments from over 50 videos across a time period 
from February to the end of June. During this five month period, most Americans were 
learning about the novel coronavirus for the first time and how it would impact their 
lives. Further, the author believed this time was an important reference point as it would 
not be drowned out by more important news stories. During this time, the national 
attention would be mostly on COVID-19 as the 2020 Presidential election in early 
November was still four months away.  
The subject of selected videos’ coverage of COVID-19 mimicked the 
conventional legacy media coverage, often discussing major developments such as the 
implementation of public health measures or controversies in the conservative media 
echo-chamber. The timeframe for considered videos started in mid-February and ended 
before August. As one can imagine, the subjects of the comments were usually tied to the 
content of the video. For example, top comments were talking about New York 
Congressperson Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the videos where she was prominently 
featured (“AOC Says Coronavirus Causing Racism…,” “Greta & AOC use COVID19 to 
Push Climate Change…,”). While the majority of comments appeared to be supporting 
many conservative talking points about the virus, it is not accurate to say all of them 
agreed with the creator. Creators got pushback especially on coverage that downplayed 
the severity of COVID-19 and comparisons to the seasonal flu. While these comments 
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were interesting, they won’t be considered for further examination in this analysis as they 
were not numerous enough and should be considered for further scholarship.  
This analysis used a grounded approach to assign various themes to the comments 
under each video. After copying and pasting all of the comments in a separate file, they 
were then reviewed in chronological order. As the subject of the videos changed from 
video to video, the author looked for any connections between the comments from one 
video to the next. The author settled on the themes of external enemies, internal 
processes, and social processes as a way of categorizing the comments as it relates to the 
individual commenter. In addition, the author consulted similar studies that examined 
right-wing coronavirus coverage and compared the comments to existing trends in the 
relevant literature.  
While the researcher did not watch all 54 videos, he did examine the top 30 
comments from each of them. Videos were viewed when the subject of the comments 
deviated wildly from the previous video or when the author wanted to know what the 
commenters were referring to in their messages. The commenters' profiles remained 
anonymous in this article but can be seen in the appendix section. While the author 
struggled with anonymizing them in the appendix, the comments are publicly available 







CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS  
In investigating this article’s research questions, the author wanted to provide the 
reader with a brief overview of the findings. The external section will examine the 
external groups that were almost uniformly criticized by the commenters. The internal 
section will seek to understand the context of the comments and examine the processes 
involved in understanding the commenters’ worldview. Finally, the social sections will 
examine how the commenters relate to others and identify themselves. Table 1 outlines 
the various themes and subsections of this article.  
Table 4.1 Outline of Subsequent Analysis 
 
I. External  II. Internal  III. Social 
A. China  A. Overriding  
Suspicion 
A. Talking to Host 
B. The “Liberal  
Media” 
B. Contempt for the Weak  B. Talking about “me” 
C. Democrats  C. Change as unmasculine  C. Talking about “us” 
 
4.1 CONTEMPT FOR EXTERNAL ENEMIES  
This section will be discussing the top external entities that were almost 
uniformly criticized by both the commenters and the video hosts 
themselves. The first subtheme will focus on the contempt for China, the 
roots of ‘yellow peril’ discourse, and how that manifested in the 
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coronavirus comments. The second subtheme will discuss the “Liberal 
Media” conspiracy, the origins of the conspiracy, and how their 
criticisms echo old antisemitic conspiracies. Finally, the last subtheme 
will discuss the commenters’ contempt for Democrats, how negative 
partisanship has shaped conservative media coverage, and its 
implications on how citizens perceive their political reality.  
4.1 CHINA  
The Covid 19 pandemic began in late 2019 as the virus was zoonotic in form and 
jumped from bats to humans in the city of Wuhan, China. Although it was unknown at 
the time, the virus was contracted by humans and spread asymptomatically in an open-air 
market, eventually becoming a super spreading event. It would take researchers another 
two months before realizing that the virus could be from people spread without obvious 
symptoms. From there, infected travelers went around the world spreading the virus to 
other parts of China as well as Europe in late December 2019.  
In early January, the World Health Organization announced a mysterious 
coronavirus related pneumonia, but they would take until the end of the month to declare 
a global health emergency. From there, skeptics and political opportunists, including 
tabloid news sites The Daily Mail and The Washington Examiner, spread conspiracy 
theories falsely claiming that the virus could be a man-made biological weapon from 
China. Research suggests that during times of national crisis, but especially during 
pandemics, minority groups are historically scapegoated (Keil and Ali, 2006; Rohleder, 
2007; Monson, 2017; White, 2020).  
For years, the United States has had an adversarial relationship with East Asian 
countries, but specifically China. While economic ties have improved diplomatic 
relations over the years, Americans’ cultural attitudes about East Asian countries and 
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their people have remained tragically regressive. Scholars referred to these biases and 
attitudes about East Asian groups as “Yellow Peril” and are characterized by the use of 
tropes as “dishonesty, disease, invasion, as well as cultural and political inferiority (Del 
Visco, 2017). These tropes are a major feature of Americans’ perspective on the global 
east and have had a lasting impact on conservative attitudes of nationalism, anti-
communism, and anti-immigration (Del Visco, 2017).  
Yellow peril, much like other forms of racialization of ethnic groups in America, 
is not static. Instead, “Yellow Peril is a fluid designation that has been used alternatively 
to label various East Asian people as the ‘enemy’ of Western civilization and to signify 
‘invasion and infection of civility by an inferior culture’” (Lyman 2000, 684). While 
these tropes can be traced back centuries ago, these ‘yellow peril’ tropes largely still exist 
in conservative spaces today. As China has increased its influence over the global 
economy, President Donald Trump has exacerbated existing ‘yellow peril’ ideologies by 
worsening economic relations between the two countries and using them as a scapegoat 
to shirk responsibility for allowing the coronavirus to spread. Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that yellow peril fears appear in many of the comments of conservative media’s 
coverage of coronavirus.  
  As outlined in Del Visco (2017), many comments castigate perceived dishonesty 
by the Chinese: “China lying is nothing new,” “It’s from China it’s their fault… China 
messed up,” “China is lying about the coronavirus,” [the virus] “was man made in 
China,” “why do you trust the Chinese numbers? They have never given any reason to 
believe them,” “China is lying about the death rate. It’s much higher than what they are 
pointing out, “You can NEVER trust the media OR the CCP!” The perceived dishonesty 
33 
of China is a main feature of the yellow peril attitudes in the coronavirus 
comments.  Stemming from the condemnation of Chinese dishonesty is a major feature of 
yellow peril: invasion.  
As Del Visco outlines, the fears of Chinese invasion can be through expansion 
and ideology. The expansion fear appears very prominently in the coronavirus comments 
in a number of ways. The first echoes fears of America having a reduced impact on the 
global economy as China has gained a greater position in recent years. The second can be 
seen in many of the commenters’ desire to punish China for the coronavirus 
economically. For example, “Something should be done to China. Sanctions?,” “Why do 
we continue to buy products from them. Bring our work home!!!! Trump 2020,” “China 
should be sued,” “China makes all our masks and medications. Brilliant Globalists.,” 
“China released this virus as a biological weapon, with the intent to tank the world and 
the US economies, thus leading to Trump losing the election.”   
While many non-partisan public health experts tried to avoid the racial 
stereotyping that follows global pandemics, that did not prevent political elites and 
conservative media from using the coronavirus to exploit white racial resentment politics 
through yellow peril tropes. Although yellow peril tropes have existed in culturally 
conservative spaces in America long before COVID-19, they absolutely show up in a 
prominent way in the comments. These fears of Chinese dishonesty, disease, and 
invasion are a main feature of commenters’ concern. While many of their fears of China 
appeared to be related to economics, commenters were also worried of an ideological 
invasion. They fear that the ideological infiltration has already reached American shores, 
particularly through their perception of the “liberal media.”  
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4.2 THE “LIBERAL MEDIA”  
A common feature of conservative media is the contention of a vast “Liberal 
Media”' that exists outside of the conservative media echo-chamber. The allegation, 
which has become a common talking point in much of contemporary conservative media, 
characterizes a vast and interconnected conspiracy by political activists to deceive the 
public by infiltrating and populating almost all of American knowledge production. This 
“Liberal Media” is purported to exist as a monolith, united in their opposition to 
conservatives and Republican politicians, and is often conceived as a single entity and not 
numerous organizations that exist independently from each other.  
The allegation of a “Liberal Media” has its origins in the late 1950’s and early 
60’s (Greenberg, 2008). At the time, national journalists covered the Civil Rights 
Movement, portraying black activists as fighting for their right to vote against brutalism 
from the police. Segregationists saw their coverage as evidence of losing the battle for 
public opinion, which inspired the white supremacist Alabama Governor George Wallace 
to adopt the populistic idiom of the existence of vast conspiracy of an elite, left-leaning 
Northeastern media were distorting the news to fit their politics - an idea that soon, under 
President Nixon, became conservative dogma (Greenberg, 2008).  
The term’s usage in contemporary discourse can be best outlined by Rush 
Limbaugh who described the “Liberal Media” conspiracy as upheld by four corners of 
deceit:  
“We really live, folks, in two worlds. There are two worlds. We live in 
two universes. One universe is a lie. One universe is an entire lie. 
Everything run, dominated, and controlled by the left here and around the 
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world is a lie. The other universe is where we are, and that’s where reality 
reigns supreme and we deal with it. And seldom do these two universes 
ever overlap. … The Four Corners of Deceit: Government, academia, 
science, and media. Those institutions are now corrupt and exist by virtue 
of deceit. That’s how they promulgate themselves; it is how they 
prosper.”  
The allegation of a vast “Liberal Media” is very powerful as it allows for the  
conservative audience to anticipate a discrepancy between mainstream and conservative 
media coverage. The term, especially when conflated with the allegation of ‘fake news,’ 
primes conservative media consumers to be sensitive to criticisms of conservative 
political figures and inspires a lowered ability to identify credible news (Van Duyn and 
Collier, 2018). While mainstream journalism relies on legitimized sources of knowledge 
production in its coverage, the term allows the conservative media audience to re-imagine 
these legitimized sources as ‘deceitful.’  
Additionally, the term acts as a way to insulate conservatives from bad press. 
Credible claims of sexual misconduct (Givas, Sep. 17, 2019), abuse of power (Gainor, 
Jan. 25, 2020), or a slow federal response to the coronavirus outbreak (Graham, Jul. 18, 
2020) are re-imagined as public attacks by political operatives and thus must be  
disregarded as partisan and illegitimate. The conspiracy is ‘self-sealing’ as the believers 
don’t have to critically examine why conservative politicians are receiving bad press or 
why conservative media coverage is different, because any evidence that points out those 
problems is re-imagined as further evidence supporting the conspiracy (Lewandowsky 
and Cook, 2020).  
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Rhetorically, the term can be used both defensively and offensively to explain 
why the conservative coverage of a news story varies from the most of the other media’s 
coverage.  
Even though the “Liberal Media” conspiracy supposedly taints so much of the 
knowledge production in American life, conservative media cannot do their job without 
relying on it. While conservative media often feel that they are not treated fairly outside 
of their specific media ecosystem (Nadler et al., 2020), they still rely on the use of 
mainstream journalism to guide their coverage. For example, PragerU, Lowder with 
Crowder, and the Daily Wire all do not do original reporting, they incorporate 
mainstream media coverage of an event as an important feature of their coverage (Legum 
and Zekeria, Jun. 25, 2020).  
However because of the salience of the “Liberal Media” conspiracy, the 
conservative YouTube audience is rarely encouraged to consume the specific coverage 
themselves and thus creates an uneven knowledge gap between the conservative news  
producers and their audience. This can lead to a game of telephone where the YouTuber 
is not only politically motivated but twists valuable information about the coronavirus 
into an opportunity to make a certain political point. In much of the early coronavirus  
coverage, mainstream news sources were cited and then discredited in the same video 
(The Coronavirus Crisis is Worse Than We Thought…).  
This knowledge gap becomes a problem where the conservative YouTube 
audience relies on the show host to accurately explain what the original reporting means 
rather than outlining what it says. This could explain why mainstream print media 
consumption led to more accurate beliefs and closer adherence to CDC guidelines 
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(Jamieson and Albarracin, 2020) and why exposure to social media is associated with 
misperceptions about the coronavirus (Bridgman et al., 2020).  
Before examining the various themes about the media seen in the comments, they 
appear to echo longstanding antisemitic conspiracies about Jewish people seeking to 
destroy the Western world with liberal policies and their purported control of the news 
media. Jewish heritage and history scholars have found origins of this antisemitic 
conspiracy theories in the 1903 Russian story The Protocols of the Elders of Zion 
(Zipperstein, Aug. 25, 2020; Klug, 2003). Levine and Newman (2018) outlines how the 
conspiracy has evolved to fit different narratives and different political contexts, but 
especially in anti-communist, religious, and conservative spaces in America.  
As we can see in the comments about coronavirus, the users feel persecuted by 
the news media which they believe to be deceitful, left-wing political activists seeking to 
harm the country. To the commenters, they believe the media is maliciously conspiring 
against them, the president, and the country: “the ‘journalists’... are attacking our 
president,” they don’t inform the public in order to make “their president look bad,” 
“We’re in a panic because that’s exactly what the [mainstream media wants] ... to 
happen. The stock market is crashing and that’s exactly what they want!!!! They believe  
this will help them in November,” “Now they tell people to freak out and panic all the 
while trying to blame it all on the President.”  
In addition to being nefarious and malicious, the commenters believe the news 
media is deceitful: “And they wonder why everyone calls them fake news and doesn’t 
trust them,” “The [mainstream media] need to find something else to complain about,” 
“these smug reporters are never asking constructive questions for the benefit of the 
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general public,” “Today’s reporters are merely actors playing to their respective 
audience,” “We have a press that cries wolf all day,” “The media sells you a crisis.”  
Finally, the comments echo the last part of the antisemitic conspiracy that the 
news media is comprised of left-wing political activists. Rhetorically, we can see this in 
the ways that the news media, Democrats, and all left-wing ideologies are lumped 
together as working together in the same plot. “You can NEVER trust the media or the 
[Chinese Communist Party]!,” “the [mainstream media] are worried about offending the 
Chinese Government,” “political activists disguised as reporters,” “today’s reporters are 
merely actors playing to their respective audience,” “The media is complaining about 
retractions??!! That’s rich. Such hypocrisy. I can’t stand the left,” “the press and 
democrats are not helping… the left does what it wants… we have a press that cries wolf 
all day,” “the media told people not to panic, now they tell people to freak out… Liberals 
‘never let a crisis go to waste,’” “the media sells you a crisis, politicians sell you a 
solution,” “the fact is left wing media panics instantly and spreads like wildfire,” “This is 
what happens when ‘Truth-in-Journalism’ is substituted for rabid ideology,” “I’d add that 
it’s not just the schools but the media pushes a leftist agenda.”  
As we can see, nearly all of the commenter’s criticisms of the media fall onto 
antisemitic tropes of being malicious, deceitful, political activists who want to see the 
demise of the Christian world in America. In the commenter’s characterization of how 
the media operate outside of their conservative media bubble, they rhetorically combine 
the news media institution, Democrats, and all the different ideologies on the left as 
working together on the same plot against them. It is curious how conservative media 
networks (Fox News, Breitbart, or the channels on YouTube) are never included in their 
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criticisms - perhaps because they tacitly acknowledge that conservative media will never 
tell them something that will contradict their worldview or ask them to reconsider their 
political alliances. “Yep. Mainstream media is imploding on itself. It’s up to YouTube 
journalists to give us the real facts and truth,” one commenter wrote.  
4.3 DEMOCRATS  
One of the most common enemies of both the commenters and the conservative 
YouTube hosts are Democrats or anyone on the left. While their contempt for their 
political rivals can be understood merely in opposition to their political goals, it does not 
explain the degree of their difference in opinion. According to Pew Research Center 
(2014), Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines than they 
have been in over 20 years. A key factor in that study asked participants not just if they 
disagreed with their enemies, but whether the opposition party is a threat to the nation's 
well-being. In 2014, 27 percent of Democrats believed Republicans threatened America - 
over a 10 point increase from 1994. Among Republicans, over a third of participants 
believed Democrats were a threat to America - more than doubling what it was in 1994.  
  This polarization is no-doubt in part due to the prevalence of partisan media and 
the ability for social media feeds to curate echo-chambers (Pew Research, 2014), but, 
more critically, the competition between the two parties puts each other at odds. Since 
most elections in American are determined by a winner take all system, many voters can 
be motivated to cast their ballots in opposition to a candidate rather than for one they like. 
This phenomenon, of voting for a party not because of your support for their platform, 
but because of your opposition to its opponent, is called negative partisanship. Through 
negative partisanship, voters can be mobilized not through their support of a certain 
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policy, but in opposition to their rival’s agenda (Abramowitz and Webster, 2015; See 
also: Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; Greenberg, 2004; Jacobson, 2007; Iyengar et al., 2012; 
Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2013, 2015; Abramowitz, 2015; Huddy et al., 2015).  
Abramowitz and Webster (2015) found that negative partisanship was responsible 
for an increase in straight-ticket voting, a steep decline in the advantage for incumbents, 
and a closer alignment between the results of presidential elections and the results of 
House, Senate and even state legislative elections. Pew Research (2020) found that 83 
percent of Amercians believe it ‘really matters’ who wins the presidency, a more than 30 
point increase since 2000. This hatred for the other side doesn’t just impact how voters 
vote, but how politicians govern themselves. In Congress, the ideological divide between 
Democrats and Republicans in both the House and Senate is now larger than at any time 
in the past century (Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Theriault, 2008; Bafumi and Herron, 2010; 
Mann and Ornstein, 2013; Kraushaar, 2014). Party unity on roll call votes has increased 
dramatically in both chambers in recent years (Izadi, 2014; McCarty et al., 2008; 
Theriault, 2008; Sinclair, 2006). Moreover, the party divide in Washington is not limited 
to the elected branches of government. On the Supreme Court, the justices now divide 
along party lines on major cases with greater frequency than at any time in recent history 
(Clark, 2009; Bartels, 2015; Stone, 2014).  
Because there are enormous incentives to motivate your voters’ support by 
demonizing your enemy, this could explain why conservative media describes both 
moderate and progressive Democrats with the same extreme language. In 2017, YouTube 
channel PragerU host Dennis Prager said “defeating the left is as great of a moral urgency 
as defeating islamism” (Rubin Report, Jan. 18, 2017). Ahead of the 2018 midterm 
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elections, Sean Hannity joined President Trump at a political rally and attacked 
Demcratic candidates in critical races across the country, calling former Missouri Senator 
Claire McCaskill a “Liberal, radical, leftist,” Arizona Senate challenger Kyrsten Sinema 
as “radical, leftist,” and Florida governor challenger Bill Nelson as “Democratic, do-
nothing, Shumer Democrat” (Maza, Nov. 26, 2018).  
While using negative partisanship in conservative media coverage is not new, its 
influence on their conservative media audience is real and powerful (Martin and 
Yurukoglu, 2017; Arceneaux et al., 2016). Because conservative media describes 
Democrats in this way, it inspires their audience to describe them as “vipers,” “leftists,” 
“miserable people,” “spreading disinformation about the coronavirus,” “[praying] for 
World War III, Virus Epidemic, & Recession,” “demon rats,” wanting something to 
destroy civilization, “don’t even understand basic reality,” and “inanimate objects [who] 







CHAPTER 5  
RESULTS  
SOCIAL INFLUENCES DETERMINING PERCEPTION OF RISK  
The second section will examine the social influences that motivate how 
conservative media consumers perceive the new political reality dealing 
with the coronavirus pandemic. The first subtheme of this section will 
discuss the overriding suspicion that motivates conspiratorial thinking 
and the perception of the coronavirus pandemic. The second subtheme 
will discuss the contempt for the weak, a hallmark of contemporary 
conservatism. Finally, the third subtheme will discuss how the gendered 
resistance to change was a major factor in the global response to 
coronavirus, but also how it impacted citizens and world leaders in 
largely the same ways.  
 
5.1 OVERRIDING SUSPICION THAT SOMETHING IS WRONG  
A consequence of branding your news show in opposition to a vast “Liberal 
Media” conspiracy that infiltrates almost all of American knowledge production, is what 
Lewandowsky and Cook (2020) refer to as an ‘overriding suspicion’ about the official 
record or account of a major news event. They outline this ‘overriding suspicion’ as a 
nihilistic degree of skepticism towards the official account: “this extreme degree of 
suspicion prevents belief in anything that doesn’t fit into the conspiracy theory.”  
In the conservative coronavirus coverage on YouTube, this overriding suspicion 
resulted in creators raising a number of specific conspiracy theories about the origins or 
official narrative surrounding the virus. Daily Wire host Andrew Klavan suggested that 
the virus could be a Chinese bioweapon in mid-February (The Coronavirus Crisis is 
Worse Than We Thought…). In late February, another Daily Wire host Michael Knowles 
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suggested that the virus was no more a threat to global health than the seasonal flu and 
that media reports about the severity of the virus in other countries are evidence of 
coordinated effort by political activists in the media to harm the economy before the 2020 
election (Coronavirus Kills The Economy…). In early April, Lowder with Crowder host 
Steven Crowder suggested that the official death rates in America were overinflated 
because people die from complications like respiratory failure, pneumonia, or ARDS and 
not the virus itself (The REAL COVID-19 Numbers...).  
In their 2017 report, the Council of Europe outlined frameworks to understand 
false information and how it spreads online. Particularly they describe how often true 
information can be said in such a way to imply something false. In their videos, the 
conservative content creators can raise the idea of a conspiracy theory (like coronavirus 
being a manmade bioweapon or that the government is overinflating death rates) without 
using the exact words to explicitly spell it out. Alternatively, creators can still endorse 
conspiracy theories despite equivocating or rhetorically distancing themselves by 
claiming ignorance or drawing connections by ‘just asking questions.’ These rhetorical 
strategies insulate the creators from legal consequences while inferring connections in the 
minds of their audience. These unfounded conspiracy theories become even more 
problematic when the shows present themselves in the trappings of conventional news 
shows, with authoritative speakers with various credentials, talking about topics in the 
news in an accessible way that is easy to understand. These factors contribute to 
worldview around an overriding suspicion that appears to trickle down into the audience.  
Keeley (1999) finds that the overriding suspicion involved in both the conspiracy 
theories raised by the content creators and the same ones that appear in the comments, 
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depends on a desire to hold onto notions of an ordered universe. “By supposing that 
current events are under the control of nefarious agents, conspiracy theorists entail that 
such events are capable of being controlled… On this view, there is some hope that 
humans can understand, predict, and conceivably control the course of human events. 
This the conspiracy theorists believe, only they further believe that the wrong folks are at 
the helm” (p.123-124).  
The author reveals that this ‘overriding suspicion’ perfectly exemplified in late 
March, April, and early May with the often repeated talking point in the conservative 
coronavirus coverage that the ‘media refuses to talk about the positives’ of the 
government’s response. The allegation goes that the mainstream media has been 
deliberately focusing negative aspects of the coronavirus outbreak instead of framing 
their coverage that paints the Trump administration in a more positive light. Daily Wire 
host and Founder Ben Shapiro outlines that particular talking point in “Ben Shapiro 
Provides Positive Updates on Coronavirus; SLAMS Mainstream Media”  
“Listen to the questions there. It’s terrible. The members of the media 
who are spending all their time asking ‘is [the federal response] enough?’, 
‘is it enough?’ They’re looking for bad news at this point. How about this, 
when a Democratic governor of a state says that the Feds are doing their 
best in providing help, you say ‘oh that’s good news!’ instead of ‘is it 
enough?’ [or] ‘what more can you get out of them?’  
The attempt to castigate the media for ‘not focusing on the positives’ is a veiled 
attempt to reconcile the severity of the coronavirus without assigning blame to the Trump 
Administration’s slow federal response. Under this framing, there is a clear villain behind 
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why the virus is perceived to be as bad as it is and further suggests that there is reason to 
be suspicious of the official narrative as the media could be exaggerating.  
5.2 CONTEMPT FOR THE WEAK  
In the wake of the controversial election of 2016, media figures and scholars have 
attempted to explain the basis of support for Trump. Some in the media saw his support 
as a result of ‘economic anxiety’ from white people of all economic backgrounds 
(Semuels, Dec. 27 2016). Others laid the blame on the growing right-wing populism of 
the Republican Party, racism, sexism, and a desire for fascism (e.g., MacWilliams, 2016; 
Rahn and Oliver, 2016; Schaffner et al., 2017; Sides and Farrell, 2016; Wayne et al., 
2016).  
Perhaps most importantly, analysts have focused on Trump’s appeal to white 
Americans who harbor animosity toward “undeserving” racial minorities. Trump’s lack 
of support among people of color and his popularity among nearly every white subgroup 
suggest that support for his candidacy was rooted in racial hostility (Luttig et al. 2017). 
Moreover, Trump’s call for law and order in the context of discussing urban unrest is 
reminiscent of previous racial appeals in American politics, including George HW Bush’s 
Willie Horton ad (Mendelberg, 2001) and Richard Nixon’s “Southern strategy” (Hillygus 
and Shields, 2008). More diagnostic still are studies showing that variables measuring 
white in-group favoritism and those measuring bias against racial and ethnic out-groups 
strongly correlate with support for Trump (e.g., Cohen et al., 2016; Gest, 2016; Nteta and 
Schaffner, 2016; Schaffner et al., 2017; Tesler, 2015, 2016a; Wood, 2017; Luttig et al. 
2017).  
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One of the most provocative essays about the energy behind President Donald 
Trump is written by Adam Serwer of The Atlantic, titled “The Cruelty is the Point” 
(Serwer, Oct. 3 2018). In his essay, he describes how Trump does not lose support for the 
harsh and nativist actions he takes as president of the United States, but in fact is because 
he inflicts suffering onto those marginalized groups, who are deemed to be enemies: “It is 
that cruelty, and the delight it brings them, that binds his most ardent supporters to him, 
in shared scorn for those they hate and fear: immigrants, black voters, feminists, and 
treasonous white men who empathize with any of those who would steal their 
birthright.”  
These elements could explain not only the sexism and racism found in some of 
the comments, but also the irreverence and enjoyment of those same remarks. However 
these comments don’t come out of nowhere: the YouTubers play a critical role as well. In 
addition to spreading racist ideologies, the content creators play an important role in 
shifting the definition of racism from a system of advantage based on race (Wellman, 
1977) to a much narrower one that includes intentionality and a desire for easily 
identifiable universal signals of discriminatory language and action. In these ways, 
creators can incentivize racist behavior while commenters can believe that they are 
actually not being racist as their actions do not meet this narrower definition.  
Trump’s support, especially around his desire to punish demographics of people 
determined to be enemies, has been named many things (Sheparrd and Jones, Oct. 5, 
2017) and often reflect key identifiers of fascism (Paxton, 2004; Harris et al., 2017; 
Robinson, 2019). As Historian Umberto Eco outlined in Ur-Fascism (1995) a key 
element of fascism is a ‘Fear of Difference’ that often results in a popular sentiment of 
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‘us vs. them.’ This popular sentiment is rooted in a chauvinistic, ultra-nationalism that 
favors the country over all else and the perceived inferiority of outsiders (Johnston, Jul. 
19, 2018). Eco outlines that these beliefs often translate into a form of ‘popular elitism,’ 
where citizens believe they are the best citizens of the world and contrast those beliefs 
with a strong contempt for the weak (Eco, 1995).  
This contempt for classes of people deemed to be foreign and weak often appears 
in sexism and misogyny. Even in covering coronavirus, the YouTubers made several 
videos talking about the ‘irrationality’ and ‘stupidity’ of female Democratic lawmakers as 
well as climate activist Greta Thunberg. In the context of Coronavirus, the YouTubers 
relentlessly mocked these women for claiming that coronavirus exacerbates existing 
inequalities. However, the YouTubers and the commenters’ misogyny did not translate 
into a uniform hatred of all women: Former Governor of South Carolina Nikki Haley and 
Dr. Deborah Birx were interviewed by Daily Wire Host Ben Shaprio in late March and 
early April - and were largely praised by the commenters.  
  Philosopher Kate Manne describes this reaction of criticizing dissenters and 
praising advocates in her book Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (2017) as being 
wholly consistent with the logic of misogyny. She theorizes that because of the nature of 
patriarchies, women are born into an “unofficial service industry” that requires “a masked 
quality about it: it is supposed to look amicable and seamless, rather than coerced. 
Service with a smile, not a grimace, is the watchword” (Manne, Jul. 11, 2016). Because 
of this ‘service position,’ misogyny acts as a form of enforcement: to punish the 
disobedient and to praise the obedient whose actions uphold the patriarchal order. Under 
her framework, misogyny isn't purely a hateful reaction. While hateful and hostile 
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reactions are directed at women who challenge men’s power and authority, misogyny can 
also take the form of paternalism and high praise.  
“Misogyny can afford to be selective because its fundamental goal is 
enforcement. Women who know their place do not need to be put in it… 
Trump also has high praise for some of the women who love and revere 
him, such as his daughter Ivanka… By saying that her father supported her 
career ambitions, as well as those of his women executives, Ivanka missed 
the point that she and they represent no threat to her father and are thus 
unlikely to come under fire. It is primarily women who challenge Trump’s 
power and preeminence who suffer his comebacks” (Manne, Jul. 11, 
2016).  
For example, Manne’s framework for misogyny is evident in how the commenters 
perceive Haley as “awesome” and someone who “just says it how it is.” To them, she is 
someone who would get enthusiastic support from nearly everyone in the comment 
section if she were to run for president. Haley is praised as she is supportive of their 
ideological interests and does not threaten patriarchy. On the other hand, Democratic 
Congresswoman from New York Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Massachusetts Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, are the victims of intense hatred and scorn from the comment section. 
They are labeled as ignorant, childlike, and weak: “She is ignorant to almost everything, 
speaks rambling sentences, and when she does convey an idea, it has little to no 
relevance. Yet she expects people to take her seriously.” “When is someone with some 
cred going to tell Warren that she is truly insane and needs help… to her face?,” “She is a 
child in an old woman’s body.” Through the logic of misogyny, the disobedient women 
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are not just child-like figures to be ignored, but insolent children in need of discipline and 
punishment. “We are essentially living through the societal equivalent of ‘spare the rod, 
spoil the child,’” one comment reads.  
However, it also must be acknowledged that even positive praise for a person is 
not without its racial underpinnings. Bill Richmond is a recurring character on Lowder 
with Crowder, which he and the commenters lovingly refer to as “half-Asian lawyer Bill 
Richmond.” While some ethnic minorities are racialized in a negative sense, some are 
racialized in a positive sense. As the result of postwar American government propaganda 
efforts, east-Asian people are perceived to be extraordinarily smart, hardworking, polite, 
and particularly adept at math (Burns and Yu, May 29, 2018.) In this context, Richmond 
is a ‘model-minority,’ who recognizes his place as subordinate and is unthreatening to the 
white supremacist hegemony and thus deserving of praise: “Crowder’s bringing out the 
heavy artillery. Half-Asian Lawyer, FULL Asian Doctor,” “I’m starting to think you only 
hire Asian professionals. That’s either racist, or very, very smart.”  
Rhetorically, the constant labeling of Richmond as ‘half-Asian lawyer Bill’ serves 
as a constant reminder to Richmond and the audience that he is from a different racial 
category than Crowder’s other white guests. The constant reminders not only reinforce 
his racial otherness, but also becomes one of the most prominent features of his identity 
and his reputation. The audience mimics Crower’s persistent labeling of being ‘half-
Asian lawyer Bill,’ but likely interprets the Crowder’s persistent labeling as a 
compliment because of the model-minority myth.  
Perhaps it is because of the commenters’ contempt for the weak that dampened 
the willingness for conservatives to adopt communitarian public health measures. From 
50 
their perspective, it would be an unacceptable reality to disrupt their daily lives to protect 
the marginalized groups whom they despise.  
5.3 TOXIC MASCULINITY AND CHANGE AS VULNERABILITY  
While the coronavirus was affecting large parts of the world, most authoritarian 
leaders resisted implementing the public health measures necessary to prevent its spread 
(Rachman, Apr. 20, 2020). In May, as many countries in Europe and New Zealand were 
seeing a slow spread and steady decline in coronavirus cases, many commenters in the 
media saw comparisons between the high number of cases in countries with strongman, 
authoritarian world leaders (America, Britain, Brazil, Russia, Iran, Italy, Hungary, and 
Belarus) and the low number of cases in countries with female world leaders (Germany, 
New Zealand, Finland, Norway, Iceland, and Taiwan) (Taub, May 15, 2020; Cox Apr. 
13, 2020). While the comparisons are interesting, and presents a significant opportunity 
to increase female representation of leaders on the world stage (Piazza and Diaz, 2020), 
the evidence suggests that gender had an influence on not just political decision making, 
but also willingness for citizens to adopt public health measures.  
British Journalist Gideon Rachman interpreted the reluctance for the countries 
with strongman, authoritarian leaders to quickly adopt public health measures as evidence 
of their “refusal to be intimidated by a mere disease.” Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, 
who would later contract the virus multiple times, said on March 29th that the country 
would “tackle the virus but tackle it like fucking men – not like kids” (Phillips, Mar. 30, 
2020). Belarusian Dictator Alexander Lukashenko, who would later contract the 
coronavirus, continued to hold public appearances without a mask, continued to play 
hockey, and was interviewed in late March in full hockey gear and said, “It’s better to die 
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standing, than live on your knees” (Evans, Aug. 20, 2020). British Prime Minister Boris 
Johnson, who would also later contract the virus, minimized the severity of the virus by 
saying that he “wouldn’t need to worry” about the virus because of his “history as an 
athlete” (Cottle, Mar. 27, 2020). After four months of refusing to wear a mask, repeatedly 
undermining his own public health agency’s guidelines, and mocking his political 
opponent for wearing one, American president Donald Trump told aides that wearing a 
mask would “send the wrong message,” according to one administration and two 
campaign officials not authorized to publicly discuss private conversations (Associated 
Press, May 7, 2020). It would take until July for Trump to wear a mask for the first time 
publicly, who was flanked by military generals at the time and was praised by aides on 
Twitter for being ‘patriotic.’ He would later test positive for the coronavirus.  
The desire to promote strength and dominance by resisting public health 
measures, reflects what Johnathan Metzel describes in his book, Dying of Whiteness: 
How the Politics of Racial Resentment Is Killing America’s Heartland, as “an assumption 
of a kind of invincibility that is tied to this idea of white masculinity” (North, May 12, 
2020). Glick et al. (2018) outlines how showing weakness contradicts a core element of 
contemporary masculinity. He later found that “Leaders who are more concerned with 
preserving a macho public image put our lives at risk as they prove their manhood by 
showing resistance to experts’ opinions, hypersensitivity to criticism and constant 
feuding with anyone who seems to disagree with them” (Glick, Apr. 30, 2020).  
The stereotype of contemporary masculinity as an invincibility and reluctance to 
show vulnerability plays out in other adherence to public health measures. Global Health 
50/50 suspected that an explanation for why men were dying from coronavirus at higher 
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levels were because of a higher likelihood to smoke, consume alcohol at higher rates, and 
lower likelihood to wash their hands than women (Global Health 50/50, 2020; American 
Cleaning Institute, 2010). Men were also more likely to spread the virus as Capraro and 
Barcelo (2020) found that they were less likely to wear a mask as well.  
The reluctance to accept simple public health measures from both political leaders 
and from their citizens directly played into a slow response to coronavirus. This 
reluctance played out in both conservative media coverage as well as in the comments. 
While many YouTubers were downplaying the severity of the virus, many commenters 
found that their lives did not have to change significantly. This reaction appeared to take 
many forms as some claimed that there was no reason to worry “zero concern,” that 
public health measures can be easily accommodated in their lives “you mean I shouldn’t 
bug out to the Rockies, I do that every summer,” and that Trump’s comparisons to the flu 
over the recommendations from the YouTuber assuaged them from taking action “sorry 
ben, but trump stating the average flu stats calms my fears.”  
Finally, because people can live in can construct media bubbles where through the 
severity of the coronavirus is portrayed only in one way, even best efforts to 
communicate risk were never taken seriously as their audience was primed to ignore 








CHAPTER 6  
RESULTS  
COMMUNITY OF THE LIKEMINDED  
The last section of this analysis will discuss how consumers of 
conservative YouTube use the medium to interact with the host, 
themselves, and each other. The first subtheme will discuss how users talk 
to the host as if they were friends, giving both praise and criticism. The 
second subtheme will examine how commenters used the medium to talk 
about themselves, especially using ethnic identity labels as a way to 
denounce something mentioned in the media coverage. Finally, the last 
subtheme will examine how the users talk to each other through in-jokes 
and a community of shared ideologies.  
 
6.1 NAVIGATING PARASOCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HOST 
Lewis (2019) outlines the various ways that conservative YouTube creators inspire 
connections with their audience. She relies on a definition of these creators as ‘micro-
celebrities,’ who have developed highly engaged niche audiences by constructing a 
public person to be consumed by others and “use strategic intimacy to appeal to 
followers, and regard their audience as fans” (Marwick, 2015). Lewis (2019) found that 
the conservative YouTubers can inspire powerful parasocial relationships with their 
viewers by using micro-celebrity strategies not only as a business strategy but also a 
political stance that positions them as more credible than mainstream media.  
Specifically, she looked at conservative YouTubers Tim Pool, Dave Rubin, and 
Blaire White and examined how they weaponized “relatability, authenticity, and 
accountability” to establish credibility with their audience. Worse, she outlines that these 
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relationships can inspire an “authoritarian potential” that destabilizes their audiences’ 
worldviews by using anti-progressive viewpoints to castigate mainstream media and 
“serve as an entryway into other alternative information sources” (Lewis, 2019).  
Thus the dynamics of the parasocial relationship between the creator and audience 
are even more slanted. The content is not only entertainment but one of the sole sources 
of ‘true’ information in opposition to a vast and interconnected “Liberal Media” 
conspiracy. Perhaps this media effect, coupled with existing parasocial relationships, 
could explain the positive comments between the commenters and host.  
Some of the positive comments involved being proud of the guests that were 
interviewed by Ben Shapiro. Over the 4 month period that this study looked at, The Daily 
Wire’s guests have included Former Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, top 
public health official Dr. Deborah Brix, and Vice President Mike Pence. These guests 
were universally praised as a success, as many of the comments seemed to be praising 
Shapiro and the Daily Wire for having such high profile guests, rather than engaging with 
what they said or the implications of their warnings of the coronavirus. Negative 
comments did not appear in the top comments under these videos.  
While many envision the conservative media audience to be uniform, who exist 
largely in an echo chamber who believe the same things, the number of negative 
comments prove otherwise. On Steven Crowder’s “Leftist Coronavirus Lies 
DEBUNKED” on March 9, seven of the top 30 comments pointed out how this video 
coverage would not age well. On several occasions, commenters posted lengthy rebuttals 
about the severity of the coronavirus. Others wrote longer essay style responses to the 
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hosts, castigating them for politicizing the virus response or criticizing the president’s 
slow federal response.  
Others criticized the programming decisions of Steven Crowder. In his March 
17th video, “PRANK CALL: Nike's Racist Coronavirus Policies!,” Crowder calls Nike to 
complain to one of their customer service employees about a number of Nike official 
policies in an offensively exaggerated asian accent. In the video, Crowder badgers the 
customer service employee about Nike’s decision to close stores in America, whether 
stores are open in Asia, and differing prices between certain shoes. Despite the customer 
service employee being very composed in his responses, Crowder aggressively tries to 
put him into a corner, asking him about his personal opinion about shoe prices and then 
conflating that with the official position from Nike. Nearly half of the top 30 comments 
disapproved of the segment or praised the customer service employee for having to deal 
with Crowder’s harassment.  
The comments appear to be a way for the audience to give their feedback to the 
show, both the good and the bad. Many of the comments were directed at the host as a 
singular person, rather than the entire program staff. This could be evidence of a 
parasocial relationship and an imagined personal connection with the host.  
Finally as evidence of a personal connection, some comments were made as an 
attempt to a joke at the hosts’ expense. A common joke against Daily Wire host Ben 
Shaprio refers to his constant mention that his wife is a doctor. While most of the 
conservative YouTube channels appear to be non scripted - as the show hosts don’t 
appear to be reading anything and occasionally use verbal crutches like ‘um’ - the joke 
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can be evidence of the audience’s awareness of common talking points and the repetitive 
nature of conservative media.  
6.2 USE OF IDENTIFYING LABELS WHEN TALKING ABOUT “ME”  
An interesting series of comments were involving several self disclosures. These 
types of comments tended to be longer and revealed a number of facets into their lives. 
While it is impossible to determine the veracity of the personal information, much of this 
information was intended to give anecdotal accounts. It is important to acknowledge that 
these comments are giving a first person account in a media environment dedicated to 
skepticism about the official narrative of the coronavirus. 
During the months of February to June, public knowledge of the coronavirus has 
developed and sometimes shifted. The virus can be spread by people who do not exhibit 
obvious symptoms, a fact that was first disputed by the WHO in February and later 
clarified in June. Masks are an important and cost effective way to reduce the spread of 
coronavirus through droplets in the air. People who leave the safety of their own homes 
should wear them in public to prevent the spread of the virus. While the production of 
personal protective equipment like masks was overwhelmed and medical practitioners 
were running on short supply, some officials told Americans to not buy them to allow 
doctors and nurses to have them. As mask wearing became an important aspect of the 
public health response, the issue became politicized and fodder for conspiracy theories.  
As consumers of conservative media, who are often told not to believe official 
reporting, government authorities, or academic studies, these first person accounts give a 
brief window into the lives of these individuals. Many of them involve identifying 
themselves with a label: “as a Christian” “I’m Chinese” “As a Mexican American” “I am 
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an immigrant” “As a Latino man” “As we say in Texas.” While profiles on YouTube 
have less identifiable information than most social media platforms, the preference for 
identifying labels in their comments is curious and echoes previous scholarship on ethnic 
identity (Brittian et al., 2014; Morrison and Chung, 2011).  
Most of the comments that feature ethnic identity labels appear to be forms of 
denouncement. For example, “As a Latino man… I can’t help but wonder why anyone 
would vote for AOC. She is ignorant to almost everything,” “I am an immigrant… 
luckily didn’t do school here,” “As a Mexican American… It makes me sick how other 
citizens of Mexican descent complain about supposed injustices,” “I’m Chinese and i’m 
sorry for the tragedy my country brings you… I sincerely apologize to you all.” While it 
is impossible to determine the veracity of their ethnic identity labels, it is curious that 
these labels appear in the context of conservative media, whose audience is 
conventionally perceived to be uniformly white. Future studies of the conservative media 
audience should look at how these self-disclosed labels of ethnic identity are used to 
denounce various objects of contempt in conservative media.  
Another feature of these self-disclosure comments do not reflect lives of privilege. 
In fact, many self disclosures included descriptions of difficult upbringings and 
precarious economic situations. “I’m VERY poor (becoming homeless is a very 
possibility in my life)” , “My childhood was nothing but pain and suffering, from the 
hands of my own father, and as a ward of the State of Connecticut… I had my share of 
other problems, including 18 months in jail” , “I’m making deliveries all over town for 
people” , “I work in customer service” , “life can be [pain]” , “As someone who works in 
a pizza place.”  
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While some of these kinds of comments were denouncing something, (“I pity the 
‘trophy generation’”), many of them were telling others to resist large changes in their 
lives because of coronavirus: “it’s not the virus itself that’s scaring them,” “[Coronavirus 
is] letting me appreciate what I already have,” “this chat was comforting and reassuring,” 
“I’ve been ‘self-quarantining’ for the past 39 years, this is great news.”  
This is to say, the many communicative features that YouTube facilitates, through 
its comment section and PSRs, found that these communicative features allow users to 
become active gratification seekers in similar ways as they would on other social 
networking platforms (Papacharissi and Rubin, 2000; Jung et al., 2007). In addition to the 
audio and visual simulation of the company that videos provide, YouTube users can 
provide avenues for communication among other conservative media consumers. These 
features allow users to explore both personal and social identities with other people they 
see as like them.  
6.3 TALKING TO OTHERS  
Taken together, the comments reflect a range of reactions to conservative media’s 
coverage of coronavirus. The comment section appears to be a way for audience 
members to communicate directly with the host. From the audience’s perspective, it can 
also be used to communicate with other audience members who are likely likeminded 
individuals. One of the primary ways that users talked to others in the comment sections 
were through a series of repetitive jokes. These jokes provided a social role, in order to 
build a connection with other audience members through their shared perspective on a 
topic. These jokes ranged in creativity and appeared to closely follow the subject of the 
video.  
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Several jokes were insensitive and often repeated. While the nature of humor 
sometimes involves taboo subjects, the jokes’ repetitiveness grew the simple joke into 
more of an internet meme. While the memes involve different subjects, like the apparent 
suicide of celebrity sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein or comparing coronavirus to cheap 
Chinese manufactured goods, they had similar effects. Their repetitive nature signaled a 
shared set of values that the jokes reflect - in the case of Epstein, that we should be 
skeptical of the official narratives, and in the case of Chinese goods, that foreign goods 
are lesser in quality than American products.  
Many of the comments also reflect a shared community around many of the same 
fears: of a Chinese conspiracy, a “Liberal Media” conspiracy, or of Democrats gaining 
political power. This feature of conspiratorial thinking in both the conservative 
coronavirus coverage on YouTube, as well as in the comments, echo a threatened way of 
life - and conservative media appears to offer audience members a safe haven to express 






CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION  
Previous studies looked at the correlation between conservative media coverage 
and their audience’s likelihood to follow public health guidelines or have misinformed 
beliefs about coronavirus. This study looked at the audience of conservative media and 
their actual responses to content. While a few commenters pushed back on the 
misinformation and misrepresentation in the coronavirus coverage, most did not. Many 
echoed the conspiracy theories raised by the hosts and many shared similar sentiments 
about the virus.  
While these YouTube channels were likely not to be the only form of news this 
audience was consuming, the channels were incredibly popular and shaped how hundreds 
of thousands of Americans saw the pandemic. With their unique attachment to their 
audience, influencers were able to circumvent traditional norms of journalism and 
sometimes elevate conspiracy theories about the virus. Yet viewers saw these YouTube 
influencers in opposition to the media organizations that exist outside of the conservative 
media ecosystem, the few beacons of truth among a vast ocean of lairs. This paper argues 
that the way conservative YouTubers covered the coronavirus had lasting effects on their 
audience and undermined critical health communications by using their agenda setting 
capabilities to shift their audience’s attention toward external enemies, fueled by division 
and contempt.  
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The first section of this discussion examined how much of the content creators 
and the commenters’ ire was focused on external enemies. These enemies were not 
unfamiliar characters in conservative media as there is a long history of demonizing 
China, the “Liberal Media,” and the Democrats. Many of the China comments fell into 
familiar ‘yellow peril’ tropes, blaming them for disease and afraid of an invasion. Many 
of these fears resulted in a desire to primarily punish China economically as a way to 
prevent further prominence in the world economy. The second subtheme examined the 
contempt for the “Liberal Media” that commenters felt were conspiring against 
conservatives. The “Liberal Media” trope was not only powerful but the subject of 
intense scrutiny from commenters. Finally, the last subtheme examined contempt for 
Democrats and how negative partisanship influenced their perception of the new political 
reality under coronavirus.  
The second section of this discussion looked at the social influences that shaped 
how conservatives perceived the coronavirus pandemic. The first subtheme of this section 
looked at the overriding suspicion that guided conspiratorial thinking and why 
commenters were willing to raise doubts over the origins of the virus or simple public 
health measures to prevent its spread. The second subtheme examined how a contempt 
for the weak was not only a feature of contemporary conservatism but a common re-
occurrence in the coronavirus comments. Finally, the last subtheme examined how the 
gendered resistance to adopt public health measures was a factor in the global response to 
coronavirus, but also a part of the comments.  
Finally, the last section of this discussion looked at the social aspect of the 
comment section. The first sub theme examined how the parasocial relationship between 
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the audience and the producer influenced how commenters spoke to the host in a familiar 
tone. The second subtheme addressed how users spoke about themselves, notably using 
ethnic identity labels to denounce things in the coverage. Finally, the last subtheme 
looked at how the commenters spoke to other commenters, demonstrating a familiarity 
between commenters based on shared values and interests.  
This work expands on the literature of Oreskes and Conway (2010) and their book 
Merchants of Doubt especially in terms of understanding how interconnected right wing 
media is, especially with regards to being a part of an ‘Alternative Influence Network’ as 
described in Lewis (2018). Specifically, this article contributes to the existing body of 
research that has looked into the origins of conservative media and how it has adapted to 
various technologies and in numerous political contexts. Finally, it understands how this 
type of political content functions and the kind of effects it has on its audience, 
particularly with regards to the spread of COVID-19 misinformation on social media.  
This work expands on the existing communications research into conservative 
media, online misinformation, and coronavirus health communication. While previous 
studies like Brigman et al. (2020) and others at the Harvard Kennedy School 
Misinformation Review looked at broader COVID-19 misinformation across social 
media platforms, this study focused more specifically at how users responded to slanted 
and politically motivated coverage of the coronavirus on YouTube. This work also 
expands on Lewis (2018) who pioneered how theorists understand the influence of 
conservative media on YouTube consumers. Further research in this field should examine 
the correlation between the consumption on conservative media on YouTube and voting 
behavior or willingness to adopt public health measures to prevent the spread of 
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coronavirus. Media practitioners should use this study to reflect on the impact that 
political influencers, particularly on YouTube, can have on spreading misinformation 
about the politicized pandemics. This article will expand on the existing study of social 
media’s facilitation of the spread of misinformation and examine the kinds of 
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